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1399 
Replacing Context for Plain Meaning in                              
United States v. Cox 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In United States v. Cox,1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit had a chance to adopt a rule of construction 
established by the Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa v. United 
States,2 but failed to do so. Instead, the court relied on its own 
interpretation of the “context” of the federal statute to reach a 
result3 that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s rule in Flores-
Figueroa and is unworkable in its application to other statutes. The 
court’s holding is an unwarranted and unnecessary use of discretion 
that, if followed by other courts and applied to other laws, will result 
in inconsistent and arbitrary results. 
In Cox, the law at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which 
prohibits the knowing transportation of an individual younger than 
eighteen years of age for the purpose of prostitution. The defendant, 
Tommy Cox, was convicted for violating this law and argued on 
appeal that “knowingly” attaches to the fact that the individual is a 
minor.4 This would require that the prosecution prove not only that 
the defendant knew he was transporting an individual, but also that 
the defendant knew the individual he was transporting was under the 
age of eighteen. The court declined to follow the Supreme Court’s 
construction of a similar law in Flores-Figueroa and instead held that 
“knowingly” does not describe the mens rea requirement for the age 
element of the law.5 In doing so, the court relied on dicta from a 
concurring opinion in Flores-Figueroa and used its own 
interpretation of the context of the law to determine the law’s 
meaning.6 The court also based its decision on the non-controlling 
 
 1. 577 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). 
 3. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837–38. 
 4. Id. at 834–36. 
 5. Id. at 838. 
 6.  Id. at 837–38. 
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position of four sister circuit cases, all of which were decided before 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Flores-Figueroa.7 
The issue of statutory construction has a long and interesting 
history, and Cox is the most recent in a long line of inconsistent cases 
trying to ascertain the legislature’s intent behind various statutes. 
Instead of viewing Flores-Figueroa as a definitive resolution of an 
entire line of cases by the country’s High Court, the Seventh Circuit 
set forth a rule that is really not a rule at all; rather, it is a call for the 
use of unchecked judicial discretion as to the meaning of statutes. In 
reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit committed a number of 
analytical errors including the following: unwarranted reliance on 
non-controlling cases; incorrect application of the Flores-Figueroa 
rule; and flawed consideration of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(a). 
The court should have followed strictly the rule in Flores-
Figueroa for a number of theoretical reasons. First, a strict rule 
prevents judges from trampling the rights of disfavored minorities. 
Second, applying “knowingly” to the age element of § 2423(a) leads 
to a more punitive and less arbitrary result. Third, strictly applying 
Flores-Figueroa would have advanced the principle of fair notice. 
II. UNITED STATES V. COX 
The case of United States v. Cox was argued before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 24, 2009, and 
decided August 18, 2009. The facts of the case and the court’s 
holding are summarized in the following sections to give context and 
background for the subsequent analysis. 
A. The Facts in Cox 
In 2005, defendant Tommy Cox met sixteen-year-old Quantan 
Champion “on a telephone party line,” and later in a Chicago hotel.8 
Cox told Champion that “he could make a lot of money as a 
prostitute,” and Champion agreed out of financial necessity.9 Cox 
promoted Champion as a prostitute, which included taking nude 
pictures of him, setting prices “for different sexual acts,” and posting 
 
 7.  Id. at 836–37. 
 8.   Id. at 834. 
 9. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010  12:53:56 PM 
1399 Replacing Context for Plain Meaning 
 1401 
the pictures and prices online.10 Under their agreement, Cox would 
set up the time and place for the rendezvous in exchange for half of 
the proceeds.11 After moving from Chicago to Atlanta in 2006, Cox 
returned several months later to get Champion and take him to 
Atlanta, where Cox continued to prostitute Champion under the 
terms of their agreement.12 Eventually, Champion moved back to 
Chicago and refused Cox’s attempts to get him to return to 
Atlanta.13 Champion’s return to Chicago put an end to his 
prostitution.14  
The United States Secret Service became aware of Cox’s 
prostitution scheme when an employee of an online travel company 
reported Cox’s use of stolen credit cards to rent hotel rooms.15 Cox 
was charged with “transporting a minor in interstate commerce with 
the intent that the minor engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(a), . . . persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing an 
individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a). . . . [and] violating 18 U.S.C. § 
1029(a)(3), based on his possession and use of credit cards and 
account numbers . . . .”16 After Cox pleaded guilty to the use of the 
credit cards, the Government filed two motions in limine.17 The first 
“sought a ruling that [prosecutors] did not have to prove that Cox 
knew that Champion was a minor in order to obtain a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a).”18 The other related to an evidentiary 
rule that is beyond the scope of this Note.19 The court granted both 
motions, and the jury found Cox guilty on each remaining count at 
trial.20 The court’s granting of the motions in limine was the issue 
on appeal in United States v. Cox.21  
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 835. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 834. 
 16. Id. at 835.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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B. The Holding in Cox 
The court in Cox held that the district court was correct in 
finding that “for purposes [of] § 2423(a) the Government need not 
prove that Cox knew that Champion was a minor.”22 In reaching this 
holding, the court first considered the text of the statute:  
A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not 
attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in 
any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, 
with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any 
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 
10 years or for life.23 
Cox argued that “‘knowingly’ modifies not only the transitive 
verb ‘transports’ but also the verb’s direct object. Therefore, 
according to Cox, ‘knowingly’ also reaches . . . ‘an individual who 
has not attained the age of 18 years.’”24 Under this interpretation, 
the Government would have to prove that Cox knew Champion was 
a minor. The court addressed this argument by joining the Second, 
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in their holdings to the contrary 
and asserting that “the most natural reading of § 2423(a) is that the 
adverb ‘knowingly’ modifies only the verb ‘transports’ and does not 
extend to the victim’s minor status.”25  
The court next addressed Cox’s argument that if “knowingly” is 
not applied to the age element of § 2423(a), it is rendered 
redundant.26 The court cited 18 U.S.C. § 2421 in rebuttal.27 Section 
2421 is virtually the same as § 2423(a) except it contains no age 
requirement and has a different term of imprisonment.28 The court 
then stated that “[t]he only reasonable reading of § 2421 is one 
under which the adverb ‘knowingly’ acts only on the verb 
‘transports’ and not on the noun ‘individual.’”29 If this is the case, 
 
 22. Id. at 838. 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2006). 
 24. Cox, 577 F.3d at 836. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 836–37. 
 27. Id. 
 28. The term of imprisonment for § 2421 is defined as “not more than 10 years,” 
whereas the term of imprisonment for § 2423 is “not less than 10 years or for life.” 
 29. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
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then “knowingly” would not be considered redundant in § 2423(a), 
and the interpretation of § 2423(a) that is most consistent with § 
2421(a) would be the one proposed by the Government.30 
The defendant’s next argument which the court addressed was 
that § 2423(a) should be interpreted in a manner similar to that of 
the child pornography laws at issue in United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc.31 In X-Citement Video, the Supreme Court interpreted a 
child pornography law to apply “knowingly” to the age requirement 
in two provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a).32 However, the court 
distinguished the case at hand from X-Citement Video by pointing 
out that in X-Citement Video, the factor that determined whether 
distributing explicit photos was illegal was the age of the individual 
in the photos.33 Therefore, even though applying “knowingly” to the 
age requirement was not “[t]he most natural grammatical reading” 
of the statute, “the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement 
should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize 
otherwise innocent conduct.”34 The Cox court reasoned that because 
transporting any individual by means of interstate commerce for 
purposes of prostitution, regardless of age, is illegal, the defendant is 
already on notice of the illegality of his conduct and need not know 
the victim’s age.35 
Next, the court considered Congress’s intent behind the statute 
and concluded that the purpose of Congress in enacting the statute 
is best fulfilled by not applying “knowingly” to the age element of § 
2423(a).36 Congress, the court reasoned, was concerned with 
protecting minors from sexual exploitation.37 Therefore, requiring 
prosecutors to prove that defendants knew a victim was a minor 
would make conviction too difficult and would reward ignorance 
instead of punishing the sexual exploitation of minors.38 
 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.  
 32. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
 33. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 34. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68, 72. 
 35. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. 
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The Cox court’s final consideration was the Supreme Court’s 
recent ruling in Flores-Figueroa.39 The defendant did not address this 
case because Cox was argued February 24, 2009, several months 
before the Supreme Court decided Flores-Figueroa. Rather, the court 
brought this point into consideration of its own accord.40 In Flores-
Figueroa, the Supreme Court interpreted a law very similar in terms 
of construction to § 2423(a) to apply “knowingly” to every item in 
the list following the transitive verb.41 To avoid following the rule of 
construction created in Flores-Figueroa, the court relied on language 
stating that “the inquiry into a sentence’s meaning is a contextual 
one” and that in a “special context” a different interpretation may be 
appropriate.42 The court also pointed to Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion, which singled out § 2423(a) as an example of a statute that 
should not be interpreted in accordance with the rule used by the 
majority.43 
III. THE CONVOLUTED ISSUE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The issue of whether to enforce a law according to the plain 
meaning of the text or according to what Congress intended by the 
statute’s passage is an issue that has troubled courts for years. In 
addition, the line of cases dealing with federal identity theft laws 
leading up to Flores-Figueroa is instructive as to the legal background 
of Cox. 
A. The Persistent Problem of Statutory Interpretation 
Two historical examples illustrate the tension that can arise 
between plain meaning and legislative intent. First, in 1889, the 
Court of Appeals of New York had to decide whether to let the plain 
language of probate laws allow a boy who murdered his grandfather 
to inherit under his grandfather’s will.44 The court held that the 
grandson could not inherit under his murdered grandfather’s will 
because it was “inconceivable” that such was the intent of the 
 
 39. Id. at 838. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. (quoting Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2009)) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 43. Id. (citing Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1895–96 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 44. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
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legislature, so the plain language of the law could be ignored.45 
Later, in 1978, the Supreme Court was forced to decide whether the 
plain language of a statute protecting endangered species should bar 
the completion of a dam into which Congress had already poured 
$78 million, in order to preserve the snail darter, a three-inch fish 
that was discovered in 1973 and found to be endangered.46 The 
Court held that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 required 
halting the dam’s construction in spite of the implied approval of the 
dam by Congress in the form of continued funding.47 The Court 
explained its rejection of a contrary congressional intent thus: 
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular 
course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in 
the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an 
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the 
judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of 
review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.48 
In both cases, the courts were forced to decide if they should enforce 
what Congress said or what it intended to say.  
Along with deciding whether to do what Congress said, or 
meant to say, courts must also implicitly decide whether Congress 
can intend anything other than what it actually legislates. Justice 
Scalia articulated one influential philosophy on this matter as follows: 
“Relying on the statement of a single Member of Congress or an 
unvoted-upon (and for all we know unread) Committee Report to 
expand a statute beyond the limits its text suggests is always a 
dubious enterprise.”49 
B. Flores-Figueroa and the Interpretation of Federal Identity Theft 
Laws 
Until May 2009, a split existed among the circuits over how 18 
U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), a federal identity theft law, should be 
interpreted. The statute imposes a two-year prison term on an 
individual who commits predicate felonies and “knowingly transfers, 
 
 45. Id. at 190. 
 46. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 166–68 (1978). 
 47. Id. at 194–95. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1894–95 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification 
of another person.”50 The First,51 Ninth,52 and D.C.53 Circuits held 
that for an individual to be convicted under this law, she must know 
that the means of identification belonged to another individual—
thereby not punishing individuals who, by chance, strung together 
digits for a social security number that actually belonged to a person. 
The Eighth,54 Eleventh,55 and Fourth56 Circuits held, to the 
contrary, that violators do not need to know that the means of 
identification belonged to an actual person—punishing those 
individuals who by chance or accident used the means of 
identification of another person. 
The Supreme Court recently resolved this circuit split in Flores-
Figueroa when it sided with the First, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits in 
holding that “knowingly” attaches to the requirement that the 
identification belong to another person.57 The Court reasoned that 
“[i]n ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object, listeners 
in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that 
modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject 
performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in the 
sentence.”58 The Court’s holding was based on the plain meaning of 
the language in the statute, and the Court noted that “[n]o special 
context is present” that would require a deviation from the plain 
language.59 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In the following sections, this Note will analyze the Seventh 
Circuit’s reasoning and holding in Cox by considering the following: 
the rule that can be drawn from the holding; the errors in the court’s 
reasoning; and how the court should have ruled in Cox. 
 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2004). 
 51. United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 52. United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 53. United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 54. United States v. Mendoza-Gonzales, 520 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated by 129 
S. Ct. 2377 (2009). 
 55. United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 56. United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 57. 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1889–90 (2009). 
 58. Id. at 1890. 
 59. Id. at 1891. 
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A. The Rule from Cox 
In looking at what rule can be drawn from Cox, it is perhaps 
more instructive to look first at what the rule is not: The rule is not 
an extension of Flores-Figueroa, nor is it a rule of construction at all. 
Rather, Cox is an exercise of judicial policymaking slapped with the 
label of “context” and supported by non-controlling precedent. 
1. Cox is not an extension of the rule in Flores-Figueroa 
The rule in Cox is not an extension of the rule in Flores-Figueroa. 
Cox and Flores-Figueroa were argued on February 24 and 25, 2009, 
respectively, so Flores-Figueroa was not available for the appellant in 
Cox to argue. Cox was not decided until August 18, 2009, several 
months after the Supreme Court decided Flores-Figueroa; however, 
other than the court’s cursory discussion of Flores-Figueroa, the 
opinion in Cox appears to be entirely uninfluenced by Flores-
Figueroa. In fact, parts of the Cox opinion directly contradict what 
the Supreme Court held in Flores-Figueroa. For example, in 
addressing the defendant’s grammatical argument that “knowingly” 
should apply to the age requirement of § 2423(a), the court in Cox 
reasoned: 
[I]n our view the most natural reading of § 2423(a) is that the 
adverb “knowingly” modifies only the verb “transports” and does 
not extend to the victim’s minor status. To adopt Cox’s argument 
would mean that we would have to read the adverb “knowingly” to 
modify not only the verb “transports” but also the noun and the 
dependent clause. As the Fourth Circuit noted, this would be a 
grammatically absurd result.60 
This “grammatically absurd result” is exactly the interpretation 
called for by the Supreme Court in Flores-Figueroa and labeled the 
most “natural.”61 In fact, the Government in Flores-Figueroa argued 
for a grammatical interpretation of the statute identical to the 
interpretation decided upon by the court in Cox.62 However, the 
Supreme Court summarily dismissed the Government’s argument.63 
The Supreme Court then proceeded to give five examples of 
 
 60. United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 61. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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everyday sentences in which “knowingly” modifies not only the 
transitive verb immediately following, but also the noun and the 
dependent clause.64 If the court in Cox had strictly followed the rule 
in Flores-Figueroa, it still could have reached the same conclusion, 
but only if it ruled solely on the basis of context and in spite of the 
plain meaning of the statute. After all, the Supreme Court left open 
context as a possible reason to deviate from the plain meaning of the 
statute.65 However, the Cox court did not choose this route, and the 
grammatical construction asserted in Cox is simply not in accord with 
the Supreme Court’s clearly stated analysis of the most natural way 
to read such a statute.66 
2. The court in Cox carved out an exception to the general rule of 
construction established in Flores-Figueroa 
The rule in Cox can most appropriately be viewed as an 
exception carved out of the general rule of construction that “where 
a transitive verb has an object . . . an adverb (such as knowingly) that 
modifies the transitive verb [indicates] how the subject performed 
the entire action . . . .”67 To other courts considering the 
interpretation of § 2423(a), the proper application of Cox simply 
would be to mirror the holding in Cox and rule that “knowingly” 
does not extend to the age element of the statute.  
Extending the Cox exception to statutes other than § 2423(a) 
becomes more complicated. Courts following Cox would attempt to 
look at “context” to determine whether a given statute calls for an 
 
 64. Id. at 1890–91 (“[I]f a bank official says, ‘Smith knowingly transferred the funds to 
his brother’s account,’ we would normally understand the bank official’s statement as telling us 
that Smith knew the account was his brother’s. . . . If [an] official were to say, ‘Smith 
knowingly sent a bank draft to the capital of Honduras,’ then the official has suggested that 
Smith knows his geography. . . . If a child knowingly takes a toy that belongs to his sibling, we 
assume that the child not only knows that he is taking something, but that he also knows that 
what he is taking is a toy and that the toy belongs to his sibling. If we say that someone 
knowingly ate a sandwich with cheese, we normally assume that the person knew both that he 
was eating a sandwich and that it contained cheese. Or consider the Government’s own 
example, ‘“John knowingly discarded the homework of his sister.”’ The Government rightly 
points out that this sentence ‘does not necessarily’ imply that John knew whom the homework 
belonged to. But that is what the sentence, as ordinarily used, does imply.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1890–91. 
 67. Id. at 1890. 
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interpretative method different from that used in Flores-Figueroa.68 
Factors that the court could consider in determining if the statute 
falls within the exception would include the factors considered in 
Cox, such as 1) how the statute in question fits into the overall 
statutory framework,69 2) whether the underlying conduct 
prohibited by the statute is “already unlawful” under another 
statute,70 and 3) the congressional intent behind the statute.71 
Following the lead of the court in Cox, a court would then be free to 
consider what is “reasonable” under the first factor, what is “best” 
according to the second factor, and what is not “implausible” in 
light of the third factor.72 The court would thus decide according to 
its own judgment whether the statute in question should fall within 
the Cox exception to the Flores-Figueroa method of interpretation.73 
Aside from the overtly subjective nature of this test, a number of 
problems exist with the reasoning and subsequent rule in Cox. 
B. The Court’s Errors in Cox 
The court in Cox committed a number of errors in holding that 
“knowingly” does not attach to the age element of § 2423(a). The 
court’s errors include the following: 1) The court improperly 
followed non-controlling precedent from its sister circuits instead of 
following the Supreme Court’s holding in Flores-Figueroa; 2) the 
court’s discussion of grammatical construction is in direct contrast to 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Flores-Figueroa; and 3) the 
context of § 2423(a) upon which the court relied is neither clear nor 
persuasive. 
1. The court improperly followed non-controlling precedent from its 
sister circuits instead of following the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Flores-Figueroa 
In reaching its holding, the court in Cox relied heavily on the 
fact that four of its sister circuits have held that “knowingly” does 
 
 68. See United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2009).  
 69. Id. at 836–37. 
 70. Id. at 837. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 838. 
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not apply to the age element of § 2423(a).74 The court sided with 
the Second,75 Third,76 Fourth,77 and Ninth78 Circuits. However, the 
one significant factor that distinguishes Cox from the cited circuit 
cases is that Cox was decided after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Flores-Figueroa. For this reason, it was improper for the court to 
simply follow its sister circuits.  
When the Cox court considered Flores-Figueroa at the end of its 
discussion of interpretation, it referenced a concurring opinion by 
Justice Alito to justify the Cox holding.79 Justice Alito concurred in 
Flores-Figueroa out of concern “that the Court’s opinion may be 
read by some as adopting an overly rigid rule of statutory 
construction.”80 He went on to downplay the reasonableness of the 
majority’s grammatical analysis and emphasize that a statute’s 
context may rebut the presumptive interpretation called for by the 
majority.81 Justice Alito then pointed to two examples of statutes 
that, in his mind, should not be interpreted according to the 
majority’s rule: 21 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (the statute at issue in Cox) and 
21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1).82 In justifying departure from the majority 
rule when interpreting § 2423(a), Justice Alito offered as support 
that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that a defendant 
need not know the victim’s age to be guilty . . . .”83 This reasoning, 
however, is itself problematic for the same reason the Cox court’s use 
of its sister circuits’ reasoning is problematic: The circuit cases were 
decided before Flores-Figueroa and would have been reasoned 
differently, and possibly decided differently, if they had been decided 
after Flores-Figueroa. Moreover, Justice Alito did not write the 
majority opinion, so reliance on his concurring opinion was not 
 
 74. Id. at 836–37. 
 75. United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 350–51 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 76. United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 77. United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 538–39 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 78. United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 79. Cox, 577 F.3d at 838. 
 80. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2009) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1895–96 (“21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1), which makes it unlawful to ‘knowingly 
and intentionally . . . employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce, a person under 
eighteen years of age to violate’ drug laws, does not require the defendant to have knowledge 
of the minor’s age.”). 
 83. Id. at 1895. 
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mandatory, though it was perhaps reasonable. Additionally, the Cox 
court must have known that in case of an appeal to the Supreme 
Court, at least one justice would side with the Cox court’s holding.  
However, Justice Alito’s opinion was not the only concurring 
opinion: Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a concurring 
opinion urging a strict textual interpretation. Scalia and Thomas 
asserted that it is not appropriate to look beyond the text of a statute 
if “[t]he statute’s text is clear.”84 After all, it is the text of the statute 
that is voted upon and signed into law, not statements by Members 
of Congress. Therefore a statute’s interpretation should be based on 
its plain text, not its context. It is easy to see how Justices Scalia and 
Thomas would rule on Cox if it were considered on appeal. 
2. The court’s discussion of grammatical construction is in direct 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Flores-Figueroa 
The Cox court’s written opinion concerning the grammatical 
construction of § 2423(a) was apparently completed prior to the 
issuance of the Flores-Figueroa opinion because the two are entirely 
incompatible.85 By engaging in its own contradictory discussion of 
the grammatical construction of the statute, the court deviated not 
just from the majority opinion of Flores-Figueroa, but also from the 
rule proposed by Justice Alito in his championed concurring 
opinion. Justice Alito suggested that courts seeking to apply the 
majority’s rule “begin with a general presumption that the specified 
mens rea applies to all the elements of an offense, but it must be 
recognized that there are instances in which context may well rebut 
that presumption.”86 The Cox court should have at least made its 
opinion appear consistent with Flores-Figueroa by doing as Justice 
Alito suggested: admitting that “knowingly” presumptively applies 
to the age requirement but pointing to the context as grounds for 
overcoming the presumption.87 Failing to follow the Supreme 
Court’s rule and instead relying on the court’s own interpretation 
was an error.  
The court’s discussion of the interpretation of § 2423(a) in light 
of § 2421 is also flawed. The text of § 2421 is as follows: 
 
 84. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1894–95 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 57–63. 
 86. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1895 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. 
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Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United 
States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.88 
The court reasoned that “[s]ection 2421 is virtually identical to 
§ 2423(a) but for the age element in the latter.”89 The court 
continued by saying, “[t]he only reasonable reading of § 2421 is one 
under which the adverb ‘knowingly’ acts only on the verb 
‘transports’ and not on the noun ‘individual.’”90 The court then 
reasoned that if “knowingly” only properly attaches to “transports” 
in § 2421, not “individual,” then by extension in § 2423(a), 
“knowingly” should apply only to “transports” and not to “an 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.”91  
To rebut the court’s interpretation of § 2421, and by extension 
its interpretation of § 2423(a), a look at the statute as a whole is 
enlightening, as is an application of the Supreme Court’s interpretive 
techniques for understanding “ordinary English,”92 as found in 
Flores-Figueroa. 
To “knowingly transport” an individual without also having 
knowledge of the individual is impossible, and much more 
“grammatically odd”93 than to “knowingly transport” an individual 
of which the violator has knowledge. This is especially so considering 
the second element of the crime requiring “intent that such 
individual engage in prostitution.”94 For a violator of this statute to 
knowingly transport an individual with intent that the individual 
engage in prostitution requires that at the time of transportation, the 
violator must necessarily have knowledge that an individual is being 
transported. If the violator does not have knowledge of the 
individual, the violator could never have intent for that individual to 
engage in prostitution. 
 
 88. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006). 
 89. United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 90. Id. This reasoning mirrors the reasoning in United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 
539 (4th Cir. 2006); however, neither case is sound.  
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 2423; Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 92. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2009). 
 93. Jones, 471 F.3d at 539. 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2006) (requiring “intent 
that the individual [minor] engage in prostitution”). 
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For example, if someone were to approach a potential violator of 
§ 2421, asking her to drive a vehicle across state lines for the purpose 
of prostitution, the potential violator would “knowingly transport” 
the vehicle. But what if a prostitute happened to be hidden in the 
van, unbeknownst to the potential violator? It would be impossible 
for the van driver to possess any kind of intent regarding the 
individual without also possessing knowledge of the individual in the 
van. Therefore, in order to meet the element of intent under § 2421, 
the violator must also have knowledge that what is being transported 
is an individual. Absence of the violator’s knowledge of the 
individual necessarily negates the intent element, thereby releasing 
our truly ignorant hypothetical van driver from liability under § 
2421. 
The preceding analysis of § 2421 is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of “ordinary English”95 in Flores-Figueroa. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) included 
the following examples of the way English is typically understood: 
“Thus, if a bank official says, ‘Smith knowingly transferred the funds 
to his brother’s account,’ we would normally understand the bank 
official’s statement as telling us that Smith knew the account was his 
brother’s,” and “[i]f we say that someone knowingly ate a sandwich 
with cheese, we normally assume that the person knew both that he 
was eating a sandwich and that it contained cheese.”96  
Following this same analysis, it is just as logical to conclude that 
the phrase “[w]hoever knowingly transports any individual”97 means 
that the person described knows not only that she is transporting 
some object but also that the object being transported is an 
individual. In justifying its contrary interpretation, the court in Cox 
said “[t]here is no good reason to read § 2423(a) differently.”98 
Apparently, the Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary is not a 
“good reason” in the eyes of the Seventh Circuit. Because the 
court’s analysis of § 2421 was flawed, its interpretation by extension 
of § 2423(a) was also flawed.99 
 
 95. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1890. 
 96. Id. at 1889–90. 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 2421. 
 98. United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 99. See id.  
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3. The context upon which Cox relied is not sufficiently clear to 
warrant departure from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Flores-
Figueroa 
In declining to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling in Flores-
Figueroa, Cox relied on reasoning from Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion, stating, “‘the inquiry into a sentence’s meaning is a 
contextual one,’ and . . . a ‘special context’ might call for a different 
statutory interpretation.”100 The court improperly found that such a 
“special context” existed for § 2423(a). As previously discussed, the 
court in Cox also pointed to Justice Alito’s suggestion that § 2423(a) 
possessed a special context that justified departure from the 
majority’s rule.101 In addition, the Cox court engaged in its own 
discussion of the context of § 2423(a) which was flawed and 
inconsistent with the contextual analysis found in Flores-Figueroa.102 
In deciding that § 2423(a) should be interpreted according to its 
special context, the Cox court looked almost entirely at the reason 
the legislature enacted the statute.103 The Cox court reasoned that its 
grammatical construction of § 2423(a) was “consistent with 
congressional intent that minors need special protection against 
sexual exploitation.”104 The court continued by reasoning that “[i]t 
seems implausible that Congress would want it to be harder to prove 
a violation of § 2423(a) . . . when the purpose of [the statute] is to 
provide heightened protection for minors against sexual 
exploitation.”105  
The Cox court’s reasoning is strikingly similar to the argument 
raised in Flores-Figueroa and rejected by the Supreme Court. The 
government argued that the purpose of § 1028A(a)(1) is to 
“provid[e] enhanced protection for individuals whose identifying 
information is used to facilitate the commission of crimes.”106 
Therefore, a limited application of the knowledge mens rea 
requirement would make sure that “potential offenders will take 
great care to avoid wrongly using IDs that belong to others, thereby 
 
 100. Id. at 838 (quoting Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1891). 
 101. See supra text accompanying notes 76–80. 
 102. See Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1892–93; Cox, 577 F.3d at 837–38. 
 103. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1892 (internal quotations omitted). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2010  12:53:56 PM 
1399 Replacing Context for Plain Meaning 
 1415 
enhancing the protection that the statute offers.”107 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument by looking to the “statute’s history 
(outside of the statute’s language) [which] is inconclusive.”108 The 
history of § 1028A(a)(1) showed that a number of statements in the 
House Reports interchangeably used the terms “identity fraud” 
(which does not require that the ID belong to another individual) 
and “identity theft” (which requires that the ID belong to someone 
else).109 However, the Court also discussed House Reports where 
Congress distinguished between fraud and theft;110 therefore, the 
Supreme Court labeled the statute’s history as inconclusive. The 
important point is that the Supreme Court looked beyond the fact 
that the law’s purpose is to punish people who use the ID of another 
person, and looked to whether Congress intended that violators 
must know that the ID belongs to another person. 
Obviously, a statute punishing the transportation of minors for 
prostitution is intended to “protect[] . . . minors against sexual 
exploitation,”111 just as a statute punishing identity theft is meant to 
protect “individuals whose identifying information is used to 
facilitate the commission of crimes.”112 However, following the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Flores-Figueroa, this weak showing of 
congressional intent is not enough to constitute a special context. To 
find special context, the Cox court also needed to conclusively show 
from the statute’s history that the legislature intended to punish 
violators who acted unknowingly;113 only then would a special 
context be present. The court in Cox did not show any such 
legislative intent, but merely concluded that “[i]t seems implausible 
that Congress would want [“knowingly” to apply to the age 
element.]”114 The result of the Cox court’s construction, as the 
Ninth Circuit put it, is that “[i]f someone knowingly transports a 
person for the purposes of prostitution or another sex offense, the 
transporter assumes the risk that the victim is a minor, regardless of 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id at 1892–93. 
 110. Id. at 1893. 
 111. United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 112. Flores-Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. at 1892 (internal quotations omitted). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
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what the victim says or how the victim appears.”115 The legislative 
history of § 2423(a) shows that this result is contrary to the intended 
purpose of the statute. 
The House Reports considering the Child Protection and Sexual 
Predator Punishment Act of 1998, which led to the passage of § 
2423(a), contain several indications that Congress intended for 
“knowingly” to attach to the age element of the statute. For 
example, in describing the purpose behind the Act, the committee 
repeatedly described violators and violations of the statute with 
words and phrases such as “pedophile,” “target a child,” “lure 
children,” “prey on our nation’s children,” “prey on innocent 
children,” and “stalk children.”116 In describing the purpose of the 
law, it would be a mischaracterization to say that the statute aims to 
punish those who commit crimes on minors “regardless of what the 
victim says or how the victim appears.”117 The language of the 
committee makes it quite clear that the law was intended to punish 
individuals who purposefully prey on and exploit individuals they 
know to be children.  
A comment in the report about a specific provision relating to 
the Internet is particularly persuasive in confirming the previous 
point: “Those who believe they are victimizing children, even if they 
come into contact with a law enforcement officer who poses as a 
child, should be punished just as if a real child were involved.”118 In 
this way, the legislature showed its intention to punish violators 
based primarily on their beliefs and intentions to prey on minors, not 
on what the facts happened to be. It is true that the Act expanded 
criminality and imposed harsher punishments for a wide variety of 
sexual crimes involving minors, and that this expansion itself could 
be viewed as a legislative call to interpret the statute to punish even 
the unknowing; however, the legislature did not reveal this intent 
through statements in its committee reports. Considering the 
evidence on both sides of the argument, the legislative history of § 
2423(a) is inconclusive at best.  
 
 115. United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 105–557, at 678, 680–81, 689, 692, 701 (1998) (discussing the 
Child Protection and Sexual Predator Punishment Act of 1998). 
 117. Taylor, 239 F.3d at 997. 
 118. H.R. REP. NO. 105–557, at 688 (1998). 
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C. How the Court Should Have Ruled 
“The modern reality . . . is that when the Supreme Court . . . 
decides a case, not merely the outcome of that decision, but the mode 
of analysis that it applies will thereafter be followed by the lower 
courts . . . .”119 If the Seventh Circuit had applied the Supreme 
Court’s mode of analysis, it would have broken from its sister circuits 
and held that “knowingly” applies to the age element of § 2423(a). 
First, the court should have looked for the ordinary meaning of the 
statute and found, as the Supreme Court did, that most people 
would read the statute as applying “knowingly” to the age element. 
Then, operating under the presumption that the ordinary meaning 
governs, the court could have looked for a “special context” to 
decide if some alternate interpretation was warranted.120 As set forth 
in this Note,121 the court should have acknowledged a lack of special 
context and ended its inquiry.  
Though this approach would possibly allow greater discretion to 
the court, and thus greater potential for abuse than the purely 
textual inquiry urged by Justices Thomas and Scalia in their 
concurring opinion in Flores-Figueroa, it would have avoided the 
precedential and interpretative problems accompanying the court’s 
actual holding. A key to properly applying Flores-Figueroa as a rule, 
and not a mere suggestion, is for courts to look for a truly conclusive 
context for the statute, one that clearly shows that Congress 
intended the law to be read in a manner inconsistent with the 
ordinary English meaning. In the vast majority of legislative histories, 
such congressional conclusiveness, especially conclusiveness contrary 
to ordinary English, would be “special” indeed and could properly 
warrant departure from the plain meaning. 
The above approach to interpreting the statute in Cox would 
have had the following theoretical advantages over the approach 
followed by the court in Cox: First, it would operate as a strict rule 
that would prevent judges from trampling the rights of disfavored 
minorities; second, applying “knowingly” to the age element of § 
2423(a) would result in a more punitive, less arbitrary result than the 
 
 119. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 
(1989). 
 120. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1891 (2009). 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 98–116. 
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court’s actual holding; and third, a strict application of precedent 
promotes predictability and fair notice. 
1. A strict rule prevents judges from trampling the rights of disfavored 
minorities 
Absent from any critique of Cox is a discussion of how the court 
used its discretion to improperly punish the sympathetic and 
undeserving Tommy Cox. Such an argument is absent because 
nothing could be further from the truth. By all accounts, Tommy 
Cox was as unsympathetic as defendants come. He was shamelessly 
pimping out a sixteen-year-old boy who “‘went along with it’ 
because he had no money.”122 He was using stolen credit cards to set 
up rendezvous in hotels and keeping half of all the filthy money for 
himself.123 Cox, of all people, deserved to be punished, and he—and 
sex offenders in general—could appropriately be labeled a disfavored 
minority of society. However, a deserving defendant is no reason to 
denigrate the judicial process. The Supreme Court voiced this 
opinion in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill by quoting Robert 
Bolt’s character Sir Thomas More as follows: 
The law, Roper, the law. . . . What would you do? Cut a great road 
through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law 
was down, and the Devil turned round on you—where would you 
hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? . . . This country’s planted thick 
with laws from coast to coast—Man’s laws, not God’s—and if you 
cut them down . . . d’you really think you could stand upright in 
the winds that would blow then? . . . Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit 
of law, for my own safety’s sake.124 
Cut down the law is just what the court did to get after Tommy 
Cox and others who sexually exploit minors. The grammatical 
constructions of § 1028A(a)(1) (the law at issue in Flores-Figueroa) 
and § 2423(a) are identical. The legislative histories of both § 
1028A(a)(1) and § 2423(a) are inconclusive. The overarching 
difference between Flores-Figueroa and Cox appears to be the class of 
defendant being punished—a difference that is not legally significant. 
To find a special context for the law, the court’s reasoning was 
 
 122. United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 834 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 123. Id. at 835. 
 124. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (citing Robert Bolt, A Man 
for All Seasons, Act I, 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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essentially that the law’s purpose is to protect children from sexual 
exploitation; therefore, Congress must have intended for the statute 
to be read broadly to get after such devils as Cox.125  
Following this reasoning, what statute is above such an 
interpretation? Is it not the case that every fraud statute is meant to 
protect individuals from fraud, every homicide statute is meant to 
protect individuals from homicide, and every environmental statute is 
meant to protect the environment from degradation? If the Cox 
reasoning were applied to these statutes, courts could cut them 
down to get after the devils in our country by simply finding a 
special context. Any statute could be interpreted contrary to its 
ordinary English meaning if the defendant (or class of defendants) 
were unsympathetic enough that her punishment was within the 
expansive purpose of the statute. This is simply an inappropriate level 
of discretion claimed by the judiciary. “Discretion increases the 
potential for abuse by a biased decision maker,”126 and for Tommy 
Cox, that potential became a reality. 
The identity of a defendant should have no bearing on how a law 
is interpreted. Carrie Buck, a mentally handicapped woman, found 
no refuge in the law when she appealed her forced order of 
sterilization to the Supreme Court.127 What she found was 
unabashed bigotry because of her status as a disfavored minority. 
The same judicial body that would later read into the Fourteenth 
Amendment the right for every woman to have an abortion128 
justified denying relief to Ms. Buck with the following:  
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory 
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. 
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.129 
The injustices suffered by former slaves are no less poignant; 
likewise, the majority of such injustices are not based on law, but on 
 
 125. See Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. 
 126. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 328 (2007). 
 127.  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 129. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted). 
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the discretion of courts to interpret laws to oppress a disfavored 
minority. It is important to clarify that this section is not included to 
evoke sympathy toward pedophilic sex offenders by comparing them 
to people born with mental disabilities or varying colors of skin. The 
point is that it is improper and unjust for two identically structured 
laws to be interpreted differently because of whom is being 
punished.  
If the court had applied Flores-Figueroa strictly, the above 
problems would have been mitigated, if not eliminated. The judiciary 
should not trust itself with the interpretive liberty exercised in Cox 
because judicial liberty leads to social injustice. The iconic symbol of 
justice is a blindfolded woman with a sword and a scale.130 This 
image of blind justice is only a reality when courts do not have 
discretion to remove the blindfold and selectively decide who gets 
the sword’s punishment.  
Strict rules empower the judiciary to make difficult, just 
decisions.131 On the surface it may appear that a court willing to look 
to attenuated assertions of legislative intent is empowered to reach a 
fair result in spite of the text of the laws; however, when a court is 
willing to use its own discretion, it loses the vital power to make 
unpopular decisions. It is doubtlessly difficult for judges to stand up 
for the rights of the Carrie Bucks, or Tommy Coxes of the world. 
However, “frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant 
duty . . . if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear 
principle . . . .”132 This power to do the unpopular was well exercised 
by the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill when the Court enforced the 
plain meaning of a statute to save a seemingly insignificant fish by 
scrapping a $78 million dam.133 If judges are to be umpires,134 
discretion lets them avoid the jeers that necessarily accompany a 
correct, but unpopular call. Such crowd-pleasing is improper because 
 
 130. Dennis E. Curtis, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 1755 (1987). 
 131. See Robinson, supra note 126, at 328. 
 132. Scalia, supra note 119, at 1180. 
 133. See Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 134. See John Roberts, My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat, CNN, 
August 24, 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement 
/index.html (“Judges and justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges 
are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; they apply them. The role of an umpire and a 
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody 
ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.”) 
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elected Members of Congress, the ball players, should be the ones 
trying to avoid jeers—it is their job, not the umpire’s.  
2. Applying “knowingly” to the age element of § 2423(a) leads to a 
more punitive, less arbitrary result 
Congress’s purpose for enacting § 2423(a) was to punish people 
who knowingly exploit children—“[t]hose who believe they are 
victimizing children.”135 For the garden-variety pimp or any other 
individual who transports any prostitute whatsoever in interstate 
commerce, § 2421 is in place with a maximum prison term of ten 
years. For the special group of deviants perverse enough to 
knowingly commit this crime with children, Congress reserved § 
2423(a). A long line of Supreme Court cases favors a heightened 
scienter element, not a lessened one.136 Heightened scienter is 
especially appropriate with a statute carrying a ten-year minimum 
sentence.  
The unjust outer limits of Cox’s interpretation of § 2423(a) can 
be illustrated when one considers that not all violators of § 2423 
actually know the ages of those whom they transport. Whether 
caused by the violator not asking or by the prostitute lying, the result 
is the same; the determinative factor in whether the ignorant violator 
receives a ten-year maximum sentence or a ten-year minimum 
sentence then becomes the birth date of the prostitute, which is 
entirely outside the violator’s control unless she were to ask for valid 
photo identification. Having considered the House Reports, it seems 
dubious that Congress would want punishment to hang solely on 
something as arbitrary as whether the prostitute happened to be 
seventeen and a half or eighteen and a half, not what the violator 
knew or intended. Under the court’s interpretation, the statute 
punishes according to the prostitute’s age, not the violator’s intent, 
purpose, or knowledge.  
 
 135. H.R. REP. NO. 105–557, at 688 (1998). 
 136. See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2009); Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (considering the elements of a law prohibiting the 
possession of fully automatic firearms); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) 
(considering the elements of a law prohibiting the illegal use of food stamps); Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (considering the elements of a law prohibiting the 
conversion of property belonging to the United States). 
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3. A strict rule promotes predictability and fair notice 
The court eliminated predictability in statutory interpretation by 
using broad discretion to interpret a statute contrary to the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of an identically structured statute just a few 
months prior. In the words of Aristotle, personal discretion “should 
be sovereign only in those matters on which law is unable, owing to 
the difficulty of framing general rules for all contingencies, to make 
an exact pronouncement.”137 Language is not one of those areas for 
which it is or should be difficult to frame rules, at least within the 
limits of applying “knowingly” to subsequent elements of a criminal 
statute; the Court in Flores-Figueroa proved this by presenting a very 
clear and workable rule. Furthermore, because of the imprecision 
and ambiguity that some argue is ever present in written language,138 
a predictable rule of interpretation is even more necessary.  
For those special instances when strictly applying Flores-Figueroa 
clearly would undermine the legislature’s intent, Flores-Figueroa 
properly left an escape route to allow courts to deviate from the rule. 
Such deviations, when necessary, would “soften the hard edges” of 
the rule.139 However, such deviations should result only after the 
court begins with the presumptive construction set forth in Flores-
Figueroa and then uses the same structured method of analysis as the 
Supreme Court to find a special context that rebuts the ordinary 
meaning presumption.140 If courts are free to decide on their own 
what constitutes a special context, any court could exercise its 
discretion to effectively let the exception swallow the rule like the 
court did in Cox.  
When predictability is absent from the judicial interpretation of 
criminal laws, the judiciary violates the principal of fair notice.141 This 
is akin to the Roman emperor “Caligula, who reportedly ‘wrote his 
laws in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, 
the more effectually to ensnare the people.’”142 Whether the law is 
 
 137. ERNEST BARKER, TRANSL., THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, book III, ch. xi, § 19 at 
127 (Oxford, 1946). 
 138. Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 984 (1995). 
 139. Id. at 955. 
 140. Id. at 963. 
 141. See Robinson, supra note 126, at 328. 
 142. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1895 (2009) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 46 
(1765)). 
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written in fine print and posted on a high pole or interpreted in a 
different manner for different people, the result is the same: People 
do not know what the law is.  
It is true that the Cox court’s holding may have advanced the 
principles of predictability and notice on a small scale; however, on a 
larger scale the court’s holding was detrimental. Considering the 
precedent from other circuits interpreting the same law, it was 
arguably more predictable for the Cox court to settle upon a similar 
interpretation.143 For example, the hypothetical pimp who was 
considering transporting someone, whose age she did not know, 
could have been influenced not to do so by the circuit court 
opinions that violators of § 2423(a) need not know their victim is a 
minor. From this point of view, applying a Flores-Figueroa 
interpretation in Cox would have been unpredictable. However, Cox 
introduced unpredictability and lack of notice for potential violators 
of all other similarly worded statutes. The looming question is 
whether courts will follow the Flores-Figueroa grammatical rule of 
construing “knowingly,” or whether they will follow the Cox court’s 
lead and use discretion to enforce laws against particularly 
unsympathetic classes of criminals. Without a uniform rule of 
construction, the public has no way of knowing what a law means 
until a court issues an opinion on it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The court in Cox had a chance to apply a rule of construction 
from Flores-Figueroa that would have simplified statutory 
interpretation, increased judicial predictability, and avoided 
numerous problems associated with judicial discretion. However, the 
court incorrectly followed its sister circuits and a concurring opinion 
in Flores-Figueroa to perpetuate a rule that invites courts to exercise 
unchecked discretion. For these reasons, Cox was incorrectly 
decided. 
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